



THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS

1620 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
TELEPHONE (202) 293-7330
FAX (202) 293-2352
TDD (202) 293-9445
URL: www.usmayors.org/uscm

Written Testimony of

David G. Wallace
Mayor of Sugar Land, Texas
Co-Chair, Homeland Security Task Force

Before the

Committee on Homeland Security
United States House of Representatives

October 19, 2005

Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson and Committee Members, I want to thank you for allowing me to submit written testimony. I am David G. Wallace, Mayor of Sugar Land, Texas. Sugar Land is a city of 71,000 people within our city limits, and a further 45,000 people within Sugar Land's Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, situated in the southwest portion of the Houston-Galveston area.

My written comments cover three areas of concern about emergency preparedness, response and disaster recovery. These comments originate from my recent experience with hurricanes Katrina and Rita and events in Sugar Land, as well as from my experience serving as Co-Chairman of The U.S. Conference of Mayors Homeland Security Task Force.

The Conference of Mayors will be holding a special meeting of Mayors and local emergency management personnel the week of October 24, 2005 to share recent disaster response experiences and further refine our thoughts on emergency response policy and the federal-state-local intergovernmental partnership.

These written comments delivered this morning will be focused on three key areas of disaster event concerns:

1. Emergency response and management issues and priorities identified by The U.S. Conference of Mayors.
2. Key "lessons-learned" at the local government level from the Katrina and Rita natural disaster events.
3. What a broad group of cities / counties are doing in conjunction with the Houston-Galveston Area Council (H-GAC) to establish and implement a Regional Logistics Center (RLC) to build local capacity to deal effectively with the immediate needs of a community following natural or terrorist disasters.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES
AND PRIORITIES BEING DEVELOPED BY THE U.S.
CONFERENCE OF MAYORS

The U.S. Conference of Mayors identified a number of first responder issues that are critical to local government. Four of the most important issues are discussed herein.

1. **First Responder Funding – A Better Distribution System is Needed:** Since the early days after September 11, 2001, the nation's mayors have expressed serious concern with the state-based system for coordinating preparedness and response to both acts of terrorism and natural disasters.

While many mayors have positive working relationships with our states and governors, as I do, there was a real concern from the beginning that an over-reliance by the federal government on a state-based distribution system for first responder resources and training would be slow and result in serious delays in funding reaching high-threat, high-risk population areas.

Unfortunately, the many surveys our organization conducted proved this to be the case. Time and time again, our surveys showed that money was not reaching our cities quickly, and when it did reach our cities, it often came with federal restrictions and rules that made it very difficult to spend on what was needed most, such as limitations on the use of overtime.

By raising concern on this issue through the release of our studies, we were able to get the support from President Bush and former Secretary Ridge to examine why money was “stuck” in many states. The special Department of Homeland Security task force created to work on this effort came up with a number of meaningful recommendations, some of which, like a waiver from the Cash Management Act, have been implemented for new funding, although not for previously appropriated funding.

But major changes to the current state-based system still have not been implemented. I know that this Committee has been very concerned with the issue of the first responder funding and has been championing a number of changes to the program, including more regionalization of efforts. The U.S. Conference of Mayors would like to make the following recommendations:

- Congress should amend the current state-based system for distribution of federal first responder assistance to provide a significant portion of the funding directly to cities and local areas

- Authorizing legislation should ensure that the waiver of the Cash Management Act, that has been approved by Congress for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, is made permanent, and made retroactive for fiscal years prior to 2005
 - Congress should work with the Conference of Mayors to make other refinements needed to the first responder program
2. **Communications Spectrum for Public Safety:** Local government continues to identify the limited access to communications spectrum as a major impediment to effective first responder interoperability and public safety efforts.
- We urge Congress to make expansion of the communications spectrum for public safety a Congressional priority
 - Congress can support local first responders by passing legislation to establish a firm date for the transition of analog broadcast to digital – hopefully by no later than December 31, 2006
 - This is needed to avoid the dangerous congestion on existing voice channels that we experience today
 - It is essential to have this public safety access to enable deployment of advanced mobile technologies such as images and video to police and fire fighters in the field
3. **Enhanced Transportation Security:** This is an area characterized more by neglect than the development of thoughtful policy.
- The recently adopted Homeland Security Appropriations bill includes only \$150 million to protect a transportation system that generated over 9.6 billion trips in 2004
 - Similarly, the potential for disaster with commercial rail freight is substantial
 - Sugar Land joined many Mayors in discussions concerning public safety and rail freight
 - The U.S. Conference of Mayors supports advance notification for hazardous freight rail. Mayors recognize that there are sensitive issues that need to be addressed, such as concern that terrorists might also mistakenly gain access to such information, and the freight rail carriers are apprehensive about sharing their client's proprietary commercial information. We want to work with Congress and the Administration to

address these issues so a system of advance notification can be implemented

- Sugar Land is diligently working with the rail companies to develop a Pilot Program for Immediate Disaster/Manifest Notification
- The process is such that if a derailment occurs in Sugar Land, a single phone call from our EOC / First Responders to the Dispatch Department for Union Pacific in Omaha, Nebraska would trigger an immediate and comprehensive manifest, by rail car number, to all the first responders dealing with the situation
- This notification model can be duplicated nation-wide with help from Congress and the Governors

4. **Military Involvement in Disaster Response and Recovery:** The federal government, and more specifically the Department of Defense and the armed forces, does not currently provide 9-1-1 related services, but should it? And, should federal authorities be given broader authority to be designated the lead agency in disaster response activities?

The federal government has a tradition of involvement in certain disaster relief and hazardous response activities. To name a few, for example, the US EPA is the lead federal agency for hazardous and toxic substance response and clean-up. The National Forest Service has traditionally been the agency that addresses catastrophic forest fires. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers often participates in flood control activities at the local level. The U.S. Coast Guard has direct jurisdiction over disasters in ports and harbors. The federal agencies, in some of these circumstances, takes a lead role but more often than not, coordinates activities with state and local government agencies.

The use of military armed forces to support civilian response, however, is conditioned by certain legal restrictions that define their possible activities. The military is precluded, except under certain circumstances, from conducting law enforcement operations in civilian setting under the Posse Comitatus Act. Posse Comitatus means “power of the county,” and is derived from the old west days of the sheriff having authority to raise a posse to pursue outlaws.

More recently, the Stafford Act has broadened the military's role in civil support.

Under the Stafford Act, the military may engage in:

- Debris removal and road clearance
- Search and rescue (EMS)
- Sheltering and feeding
- Public information
- Providing advice to local government on disaster and health/safety issues

Under the Stafford Act the military may not engage in:

- Traffic control
- Security at non-federal facilities
- Patrolling civilian neighborhoods except to provide humanitarian relief

The Stafford Act requires the local government to make an assessment and declaration that local resources have been overwhelmed. The state must then make an assessment that state resources have been overwhelmed. The federal government may then take action and send resources. This time consuming process is frequently circumvented and informal calls are placed to state and federal agencies to activate resources while the declarations are processed.

The Insurrection Act allows the President to call forth troops during an insurrection or civil disturbance. The Department of Defense Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civilian Disturbances, permits the military to intercede in local events without a Presidential Order. The Directive may be invoked if duly constituted authorities are unable to control the situation and circumstances preclude obtaining a Presidential Order, and the military action will prevent human suffering, save lives and/or mitigate great property damage.

There are events of a certain nature that require immediate military intervention and/or pre-staging. For example:

- The detonation of a nuclear device, such as a suitcase nuclear device, would be expected to render the local and state government incapable of mounting adequate disaster response

- Widespread biological attack or disease outbreak would require national command and control measures be implemented
- Mega catastrophes such as Katrina and Rita that could be reasonably anticipated to overwhelm local and state response capabilities

The military can offer expertise in many areas that support disaster relief:

- Ability to mobilize large numbers of self-sufficient personnel
- Advanced logistical operations support
- Experience with command and control methodologies just now being implemented at the local level via NIMs
- Capability to provide mass feeding, water, shelters and other support to disaster victims
- Easily move across political boundaries
- Provide specialized equipment and trained personnel to address incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) agents
- Re-establish critical infrastructure including communications and mass care

The military does not routinely provide the following response and relief efforts:

- Urban search and rescue
- Firefighting
- Civilian law enforcement duties (e.g., patrols, arrest, seizure)

The military's primary role is the provision of national defense and security. There is a natural question that arises – what impact would deployment of forces to overseas conflicts have on their availability to support disaster response. Furthermore, if local/state disaster response plans rely too heavily on the military does their mobilization for defense and national security leave local and state emergency plans vulnerable? It should be pointed out that terrorist DO NOT act at a time and place that is convenient to our national security. For example, if our military has resources deployed in foreign land fighting a war on terrorism, and a natural disaster occurs in the domestic USA that requires a significant deployment of military personnel and equipment, one should be prepared for a terrorist to plan an attack on assets in a more geographically vulnerable and less protected area.

The current legal paradigm is that the military is viewed as the “resource of last resort” deployed to restore order. However, hurricanes Katrina and Rita have given us reason to re-evaluate this paradigm. Because of the sheer magnitude of the hurricane events recently experienced, and because acts of terrorism may spring up during or in the wake of such natural disasters, it is advantageous to consider an increased role for the military in disaster response.

However, Mayors favor a “layered” approach to deploying military assistance as well as state assistance in response and recovery efforts. Rather than maintain the status quo, and rather than confer lead agency status on the military (with some exceptions) it would be helpful if the process of triggering federal assistance were improved. Furthermore, an additional layer of response, utilizing cities in alternative geographic regions, should also be considered.

Virtually every municipality has entered into “mutual aid” or “inter-local” agreements for first responder activities, debris removal, etc. However, as was seen with hurricanes Katrina and Rita, such agreements were rendered useless as ALL municipalities in the respective target region required full deployment of their personnel and assets. What should be explored is the ability of municipalities to enter into such “mutual aid” agreements with other cities / metro areas with geographic dispersion to enable regions to provide “real time” assistance and aid to the target region.

Under the leadership of the co-chairman of the Homeland Security Task Force of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, Baltimore mayor Martin O’Malley is looking to formalize “inter-metropolitan” agreements with many of our member mayors and their cities. The U.S. Conference of Mayors is currently researching the benefits and logistical / legal issues surrounding such “inter-metropolitan” agreements. Nevertheless, a rough draft of the pertinent language of such agreement can be found attached hereto in Exhibit “A.”

Clearly, regardless of the changing role of the military and federal agencies in local disaster response efforts, the primary focus of Congress should be to help local first responders develop military like logistics capabilities to address the immediate needs of both natural and man-made disasters.

**KEY “LESSONS-LEARNED” AT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LEVEL FROM THE KATRINA AND RITA
NATURAL DISASTER EVENTS**

The second area of testimony is derived from first-hand experience involving evacuation efforts related to hurricane Rita, and relief efforts for hurricane Katrina evacuees in the Houston-Sugar Land area.

1. **Reverse Nine-One-One: Communicating with the Public During Hurricane Rita:** Reverse nine-one-one is, simply stated, instead of citizens calling in to report an emergency, local government sends calls out to the citizens. In the case of hurricane Rita, Sugar Land arranged to have its contract 9-1-1 auto-dialer service send a taped message to its residents to encourage evacuation for those having medical or physical disabilities/impairments. This turned out to be not only partially effective, but also counterproductive to some extent.
 - It was determined that the contract “Reverse 9-1-1” service provider was also used by numerous cities, counties, etc. in the H-GAC area
 - The auto-dialer services were inundated by a myriad of city and county agencies sending similar messages
 - The queue of calls was so long that when Sugar Land placed its 12:00 Noon order for the call, it fell behind over 750,000 other “reverse 9-1-1” calls, and the “emergency message” was not received by our residents until 8:00 to 9:00 PM, a full eight to nine hours later
 - Inasmuch as the weather patterns adjusted materially during such an eight to nine hours period, it is counter-productive to have the auto-dialer message sent out after the decision is made to halt the evacuation encouragement, and to suggest residents to shelter-in-place
 - Now the obvious response to this dilemma is to contract with numerous auto-dialer services to increase the rate of calls per minute.

2. **Limited Evacuation Transportation Service Provider Capacity- Hurricane Rita:** Many hospitals, nursing homes, hospices and other health care institutions housing or treating disabled patients have established contracts with emergency evacuation transportation service providers. Yet, many of these institutions found themselves waiting for services that came late or did not come at all.
- When the list of emergency transportation service providers was examined it became clear that the overall list was relatively limited in the immediate region
 - It also became clear that the service providers had sufficient vehicles and personnel for limited evacuations, yet were “oversubscribed” in the case of a major disaster event where several institutions would be affected
 - The lesson-learned is to educate institutional consumers about contracting arrangements that go beyond the small-scale local evacuation need situations and ensure redundant capabilities
 - Where institutions are responsible for evacuating clients or patients, they should ask service providers to disclose their other client demands in a large-scale disaster event
3. **Evacuation Plan Lacking in Hurricane Rita:** The decision to evacuate residents when hurricane Rita was about to hit land in the Texas gulf area was made by local governments, led by Houston/Harris County. The call to evacuate was not led by the state through a centralized process.
- The regional evacuation plan had not been fully adopted by all affected jurisdictions, and had not been comprehensively tested through exercises.
 - The Department of Public Safety did not have adequate personnel to immediately direct traffic management when traffic tie-ups occurred in outlying and pass-through counties
 - Police in small towns along the evacuation route had not been instructed on the plan or their role in moving traffic through their jurisdictions (i.e., a red light in Giddings, TX literally backed-up traffic to Brenham, TX.)
 - Construction on major highway routes caused immediate traffic problems
 - There was no plan in place to replenish food, water and fuel supply on major evacuation routes

4. **Media Coverage and Public Perception Exacerbated the Situation:** Local government often relies on the media to help in emergency situations, but in the case of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the massive media coverage ended up confusing the public.

- Recent video and print media images of devastation along the Gulf Coast fueled the public's perception of danger, resulting in an urge to flee the region ahead of the storm. This resulted in evacuation of areas in the region that are not normally required to evacuate during a hurricane
- The media coverage presented dramatic predictions of widespread destruction resulting from a Category 5 hurricane thereby reinforcing the public's urge to flee
- Future calls for evacuation are likely to be met with skepticism and reluctance on the part of the public
- The lesson-learned is that local government should re-evaluate the regional evacuation plan and continue to develop and improve a coordinated public education plan to ease public concern over the evacuation process

5. **Hurricane Response and Recovery Issues – Hurricane Katrina:**

The state of Texas, in its efforts to provide care and compassion to its Gulf Coast Neighbors, offered to accept hurricane Katrina evacuees. Because of the emergency, "life saving" requirements, many decisions were made based on the best information at hand, and in some cases, without adequately assessing the impact a sudden influx of people would have on local governments.

- Standard procedures were waived to deal with the unusual circumstances caused by the evacuee's needs
- Circumventing the normal procurement process, and in some cases changing the rules along the way, may result in an inability of municipalities to obtain reimbursement for response, care and recovery expenditures
- This may affect local government budgets and liquidity, and could adversely affect the business economics of vendors who came to the aid of the evacuees
- If this is not dealt with fairly, and if new policies and procedures are not adopted to reflect such situations, then it may have a chilling affect on municipal mutual aid and disaster response efforts in the future.

6. **Emergency Plans Proved Inadequate for a Disaster of the Magnitude of Hurricane Katrina:** The events surrounding Katrina overwhelmed affected local governments, states and federal response agencies.

- What we experienced in Sugar Land was an appearance of a lack of communication between Louisiana and Texas
- Communication between Austin and local jurisdictions was limited and affected the resulting emergency response activities
- Notwithstanding the required time frames to mobilize personnel and equipment, FEMA appeared to be under-prepared for an incident of this magnitude
- The Red Cross was overwhelmed with requests for shelters and could not staff or operate the number of shelters required in outlying areas
- The efforts of good Samaritans (faith communities, service organizations, and other groups) were key to supporting evacuee needs. However, at times the effort was fragmented and lacked coordination
- The lesson-learned was that disasters of great magnitude quickly overwhelm affected local governments, states and federal response agencies. Emergency plans and various assumptions contained in those plans must be examined for accuracy, adequacy, and be modified to address disasters of great magnitude.

7. **General Lessons-Learned from the Hurricane Katrina and Rita Incidents:** The mass evacuation and sheltering process that resulted from both hurricanes will provide a template for revision of plans needed to address bioterrorism, radiological dispersal devices, nuclear, and other events that may result in mass population relocation. Both events required local coordination. The leadership in the H-GAC area performed many roles normally perceived as being functions of the State. Regional oversight and coordination proved beneficial in these incident experiences. The region should move forward with the development and adoption of regional based emergency response plans. In fact, the state of Texas has performed such research and has previously developed a regional proposed plan for deployment of personnel and equipment in twelve pre-selected regions of the state (See Exhibit “B”).

**THE HOUSTON-GALVESTON AREA COUNCIL –
REGIONAL LOGISTICS CENTER (RLC) MODEL:
BUILDING LOCAL CAPACITY TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY
WITH NATURAL AND TERRORIST DISASTERS**

Sugar Land and the Houston-Galveston Area Council (H-GAC) communities have worked for the last two years on developing a mechanism to enhance local first responder capabilities for natural and terrorist disaster events. The mechanism is referred to as a Regional Logistics Center (RLC). The H-GAC communities adopted a resolution in 2004 (See Exhibit “C” for the unanimously H-GAC Board approved concept) to support the establishment of an “all-hazards” logistics center that would service the region in a disaster event. Sugar Land and H-GAC convened a local/regional government Summit in October 2004 to further develop the concept, and it garnered considerable political support.

The idea behind the concept was to establish a mechanism that would pool the resources of cities to deal more effectively with first responder activities during a major catastrophe. While individual communities are adding to their disaster supplies and equipment inventories with homeland security federal financial assistance granted from Washington through the states, the scattered state of supplies and equipment, as well as the lack of military-like logistics support make their coordinated application less likely to be efficient and effective in the event of a major disaster. The RLC approach remedies that shortcoming by pooling some of those emergency response resources coupled with professional grade logistics management to a pre-positioned cache of equipment that is maintained and managed for a response ready deployment.

Enhancing local first responder capabilities is necessary because the federal government can not be expected to mount a substantial emergency response for a period of 72 to 120 hours after a natural disaster of the magnitude of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, or in a WMD event where there is no warning. This is called the “*Critical Logistics Capacity Gap*” period. This response *Gap* manifests itself in the time it takes to stage, transport and distribute life support commodities from sources outside the region. In the case of man-made terrorism events, this *Gap* extends to time required to assess the type of critical and sophisticated equipment needed for the identification, suppression and remediation.

This ***Critical Logistics Capacity Gap*** could be fulfilled by Regional Logistics Centers developed and managed under local authority. An RLC or multiple RLCs would provide the metro region with the first responder supplies and equipment necessary to help the general population experiencing a major disaster during that critical 72 to 120 hours until state and federal relief can arrive on the scene to augment and replenish the local resources. The RLCs would continue to provide support for first responders during the post incident recovery period after state and federal aid arrives at the incident scene.

The House and Senate Homeland Security Appropriations Committees recently stated support for the idea in their conference committee report. ***“The conferees note that there is no real-time exchange of information at the regional or interstate levels regarding equipment and supplies inventory, readiness, or the compatibility of equipment. The conferees encourage ODP to review the use of logistics centers to consolidate State and local assets, provide life-cycle management and maintenance of equipment, allow for easy identification and rapid deployment during an incident, and allow for the sharing of inventories across jurisdictions.”***

We urge Congress to encourage the Office for Domestic Preparedness in the Homeland Security Department to proceed without delay in reviewing the value and use of logistics centers. We also urge Congress to provide funding this year for a demonstration program to establish and make operable a number of Regional Logistics Centers in the United States.

EXHIBIT "A"

MUTUAL AID AGREEMENT

WHEREAS, the cities of _____ and _____ (collectively the "parties") recognize the value and the potential need of assisting each other in the event of some emergency, and each city has personnel, equipment, and resources that could assist the other in an emergency,

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows this ____ day of _____, 2005:

1. In the event of an emergency as declared by the Mayor of one of the cities that is a party to this agreement, and upon the request of the Mayor of that city, the Mayor of the other city commits to send forthwith and without delay such public safety (fire and police), public works, transportation, and other personnel, equipment, and resources as may be of assistance to the city confronting an emergency. This obligation to provide assistance shall be subject to the right of any city sending resources to withhold resources to the extent necessary to provide reasonable protection for the safety and protection of its citizens.

2. The city sending personnel, equipment, and resources to respond to an emergency in the other city agrees to bear the cost of its action pending the execution of any necessary contracts or other documents to seek reimbursement from any agency of the federal or state governments, including, without limitation, the Federal Emergency Management Administration, or any similar or counterpart state emergency management agency. The parties shall work together closely and cooperatively to obtain any federal or state reimbursement that may be available. In the event that reimbursement for some or all provided services is unavailable, the city sending personnel, equipment, and resources shall be entitled to request reimbursement from the other city and that city shall make a good faith effort to provide in a timely fashion reimbursement for all unreimbursed expenses.

3. All personnel, equipment, and resources made available to a city confronting an emergency shall, while in the city confronting an emergency, operate under the command, control, and supervision of the appropriate responsible officials in the city confronting the emergency.

4. Within 45 (forty-five) days of the parties' execution of this mutual aid agreement, each city shall, to the extent necessary, modify or amend its respective emergency management plans to reflect the obligations set forth in this agreement.

EXHIBIT “B”

**EXCERPT FROM STATE OF TEXAS REGIONAL INCIDENT
MANAGEMENT TEAMS PRESENTATION TO THE GOVERNOR
DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Office of the Governor**

Synopsis: Establish Regional Incident Management Teams (IMT’s) to assist with command and control of large-scale terrorist attacks and/or natural/man-made disasters. The IMT’s will be comprised of fire, EMS, law enforcement, public works and public health professionals from multiple jurisdictions. Each team should have a minimum of 42 members for triple redundancy for each of the 14 positions.

Summary: Establishing Regional (Type III) Incident Management Teams (IMT’s) will provide a cadre of highly trained, qualified, and experienced incident command officers and staff to support and complement the existing jurisdictional command staff during significant and long-term incidents. The IMT concept is applicable for managing any type of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) terrorist attack. This initiative is based on an “all-hazards” and unified command approach. As an added value, the regional IMT’s can provide command and control at natural and/or man-made disasters such as severe weather events (hurricane, floods, tornados, etc.), hazardous materials releases, civil unrest, public health emergencies, etc. The IMT concept is a national model and is utilized extensively for command and control of large-scale incidents under NIMS and Presidential Directive HSPD-5.

The Regional IMT’S will be multi-disciplinary team comprised of approximately 42 members from fire, emergency medical services, law enforcement, public works and public health professionals from the participating regional jurisdictions. This 42 person team allows for three deep in each of the 14 critical team positions. Each team member will be trained and certified in command and general staff or support positions.

Regional IMT’S can be activated for local response through existing mutual aid agreements or by the DPS Disaster District Chairman. A full staffed team will entail approximately 14 positions (see slide). Individual Team staffing may vary as needed based on specific incident requirement.

EXHIBIT “C”

REGIONAL LOGISTICS CENTER CONCEPT (AS PRESENTED IN SEPTEMBER, 2004)

The H-GAC region, through the leadership and cooperation of its local elected officials and first responder agencies, has made dramatic progress in enhancing homeland security preparedness, and the ability to respond to other hazards. Additional resources will continue to enhance local and regional capabilities. All Texas local jurisdictions continue to benefit from the Governor’s initiative and focus on homeland security, and an all hazards approach.

These outstanding efforts and capabilities equip the region to meet many emergency response challenges. Some challenges, however, are inherently beyond the scope of even the best coordinated local efforts. Among those could be: a 9/11 magnitude terrorism event, multiple category 4 storms such as those that occurred in Florida, a major event in a remote location. Events of this type might quickly exhaust local resources, not only for specialized response equipment, but even for such common items as shovels or gloves.

Critical supply needs for an unusually large or extreme emergency response event can be addressed through an Emergency Preparedness and Response Logistics Center, a ready store of equipment available if and when local stocks are in danger of being exhausted. Because the timing of a major event is unknown, as is the location, a public/private partnership could be developed to take advantage of capabilities already in existence in the military supply sector, and possibly access innovative financing, if necessary.

Among the types of equipment that could be stocked in quantity at a logistics center are:

- Specialized detection and metering equipment for radioactive and biological hazards. This equipment is expensive to acquire in quantity and must be calibrated and maintained.
- Decontamination equipment and supplies in quantities for hundreds or thousands of persons.
- Highly specialized and expensive equipment.
- Basic tools and equipment to augment local resources and quickly replace local stocks as exhausted.

The inventory of the prototype logistics center would be determined collaboratively through the efforts of appropriate officials of the Department of Homeland Security, State of Texas, local first responders and emergency managers. A process would be developed to allow agencies to quickly access logistics center stocks as needed.

Next Steps

- Obtain broad local government support for concept.
- Develop support from State of Texas and Department of Homeland Security.
- Request designated Federal authorization and appropriations.
- Detail local plans and processes.